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Challenges and Opportunities for the Indonesian
Securities Takeover Regulations: A Comparative
Legal Analysis
Yozua Makes*
This article examines the extent to which the rules in Indonesia
concerning the takeover of a publicly listed company: (1) facilitate an
efficient exchange of shares in the capital market with fair protection
for all stakeholders in a takeover transaction pursuant to Good
Corporate Governance (“GCG”) principles; and (2) uphold principles
and protection provided by the securities laws of more developed
jurisdictions. These issues are addressed by analyzing the prevailing
securities regulations and GCG rules in Indonesia. A comparative
discussion of laws and regulations in Indonesia and the Netherlands
follows. The article highlights several important findings from which the
Indonesian legal system can learn from both European and Dutch
takeover laws. First, Indonesia has been experiencing a trend toward a
lower mandatory bid threshold requirement in order to facilitate a more
active takeover market. The share percentage threshold for triggering a
mandatory offer in Indonesia is lower than that of the Netherlands,
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although in Indonesia, control can be assessed by the degree of one’s
influence within the company’s governance. In pricing the mandatory
bid, the two countries adopt a different approach, but the Netherlands
arguably adopts a more case-specific approach through the active
involvement of its judiciary. Regarding disclosure of the control
structure, the shareholding structure of the target company in the
Netherlands is more advanced because it captures indirect structures,
such as pyramid structures or cross ownership. Indonesia can also
learn from its European counterpart in relation to the employee
involvement in proceeding with a takeover deal. In the Netherlands, as
in Indonesia, the employee does not have the authority to approve or
disapprove a takeover; however, employees have the right to receive
information, consultation rights, and a dispute settlement forum
specifically for labor matters in the event of a change of corporate
control. Indonesian law, on the other hand, prescribes that a takeover
must take into account the employees’ interests without setting out
further detailed rules. Finally, the role of the judiciary in Indonesia
must be improved in order to provide a fair, orderly, and efficient
capital market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been increasing attention given to the importance of
takeovers in supporting Indonesia’s economic growth. Indonesia’s capital
market has experienced a significant increase in takeovers through asset and
share acquisitions, which have contributed to and are stimulating the growth of
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (“IDX”) composite share price index.1 Merger
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There is no comprehensive data on takeover deals available in Indonesia. Hence,
information regarding takeovers is limited to companies listed on the IDX, or those
deals that are announced publicly as required under the capital market regulations. In
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activity in the United States, for example, shows that the number and price of
takeovers affect the dynamics of its capital market.2 A takeover reflects the
business fundamentals and perception of the issuer, and may consequently
affect the Indonesian stock market in general. An inefficient “market for
corporate control”3 would discourage optimal corporate growth and, in the
long run, result in a more stagnant capital market.4 At the same time, the
benefit of the expected growth must be fairly allocated between both the
controlling and the minority shareholders. Therefore, to support the healthy
growth of the market, securities regulations must facilitate transactions in the
capital market by balancing fairness and efficiency.
This article examines the extent to which the rules in Indonesia
concerning takeover of a publicly listed company (1) facilitate efficient
exchange of shares in the capital market with fair protection for all
stakeholders in a takeover transaction pursuant to GCG principles; and (2)
accommodate the principles and protection provided in the securities laws of
more developed jurisdictions. This article will address the first part of the
question by analyzing the current Indonesian legal framework from the
perspective of fairness and efficiency in securities law and corporate
governance principles. A comparative discussion of laws and regulations in
Indonesia and the Netherlands, including the incorporation of the EU Takeover
Directive, will address the second part of the question.
From a comparative company law perspective, 5 there are several
reasons why this article uses Netherlands as a benchmark country. First,
Indonesian company law is founded on Dutch company law following the
colonial era.6 However, since then many driving forces have influenced both
countries’ securities laws and GCG principles. Both Indonesia and the
Netherlands are concerned about corporate scandals in the United States, and
many countries have reconsidered how they should handle corporate

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
recent years, takeovers of companies listed on the IDX have been driven mainly by the
mining and retail sectors. Other industries also active in takeover deals are
telecommunications and banking. The author would like to thank M. Ajisatria
Suleiman for his assistance in completing this research.
2
See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 2-5
(2000) (describing the merger and acquisition movement and its relationship with the
U.S. economy).
3
CARNEY, supra note 3, at 36.
4
See id. at 36 (describing the general economic structure of acquisition).
5
See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, 1162-91 (ECGI Working Paper
Series in Law, Working Paper No. 77, 2006) (laying out the general framework of
comparative company law).
6
Id. at 1178. Before Indonesia enacted the first company law in 1995, the company
law in the country was based upon the provisions of the Indonesian Commercial Code,
also known as Wetboek van Koophandel, promulgated in 1847 during the Dutch
colonial era. See BENNY S. TABALUJAN, INDONESIAN COMPANY LAW: A TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY 18 (1997).
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governance practices.7 In Indonesia, a determining factor was its economic
downturn during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, which many experts
argued was primarily due to the failure of corporate governance (policies).8
Meanwhile, the corporate governance system in the Netherlands underwent
important changes during the first half of the 1990s.9
One such change in Dutch takeover regulations was the introduction
of the European Union (EU) Takeover Directive, which aims to create a
harmonized playing field for the European capital markets in order to support
the region’s economic integration.10 The Directive adopts rules, which have
been transposed into Dutch law, that share similarities with, or can serve as a
benchmark for, the Indonesian securities takeover laws. Therefore, due to both
their common ancestry and the recent divergence of their laws, it is useful to
assess how these two countries have developed their takeover rules.
To properly compare Indonesia and the Netherlands, this article will
focus on the differences between the two countries’ corporate structures
because such differences demonstrate the characteristics of each countries’
securities laws and corporate governance principles. 11 In Indonesia, the
corporate structure is dominated by concentrated ownership in the hands of a
limited number of business groups that control market capitalization. 12 In
Indonesia and similar countries, the protection of minority shareholders rather
than majority or controlling shareholders is more vital than in countries with
dispersed ownership. Compared to that of Indonesia, the ownership structure
in the Netherlands is one of the most dispersed, although it is not as dispersed
as those of the United States or the United Kingdom.13

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance
Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 243, 261-67 (2002).
8
See infra, notes 22, 25-27; see also Carolyn Currie, Regulatory Failure in Emerging
Market, (UTS Sch. Fin. Econ. Working Paper No. 118, 2002) (discussing regulatory
failure in financial crisis using the case of Indonesia).
9
Jaron van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael Schouten & Jaap Winter, Corporate
Governance in the Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW
3-5 (2009).
10
See COMMON LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE 4-8 (Dirk Van
Gerven, ed., 2008).
11
See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 512 (1999) (“[I]t seems more
likely that the existing ownership structures are primarily an equilibrium response to
the domestic legal environments that companies operate in.”).
12
Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study,
Disclosure, Information and Enforcement, OECD (Mar. 2012), available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/38/50068886.pdf (citing OECD-Indonesia policy dialogue
on disclosure of beneficial ownership and control, Bali on 5 Oct. 2011, in which the
author quoted S. Claessen, S. Djankov and L.H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership
and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000)); see also, Benny
S. Tabalujan, Family Capitalism and Corporate Governance of Family-Controlled
Listed Companies in Indonesia, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 486, 513 (2002).
13
See Renneboog et al., supra note 8, at 261-67; see also John C. Coffee, The Future
as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its
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This article argues that in Indonesia there is a tension in the regulatory
objective of takeover rules, i.e. facilitating a more active market and protecting
the relevant parties (especially the minority shareholders), the business
sustainability of the target company, and other stakeholders such as
employees. In a broader framework, the academic debate on comparative
corporate governance has also raised this issue, because of the different nature
of company law and corporate governance on the one hand (which embraces
fair protection of not only shareholders but also stakeholders) and securities
law on the other hand (which aims at facilitating efficient market exchange
among shareholders).14 The objective of the Indonesian securities law regime
is contemplated in Law Number 8 of 1995 on the Capital Market (“Law
8/1995”), pursuant to which the objective of the law and regulatory institutions
is to create an orderly, fair, and efficient (teratur, wajar, dan efisien) capital
market in the interests of shareholders and society as a whole.15
There is no formal agreed upon English translation of the Indonesian
term “pengambilalihan” as used in Law No. 40 of 2007 (“Law 40/2007”) and
Government Regulation No. 27 of 1998 (“GR 27/1998”). While the word
commonly is translated as “acquisition”, in practice the term occasionally is
translated as “takeover.”16 In this article the terms “acquisition” and “takeover”
are used interchangeably to mean the procurement of a controlling interest in a
company or its assets. In Indonesia, takeovers of public companies are a
common practice. Generally, there first is an acquisition of company shares,
which leads to an obligation to conduct a mandatory bid—namely, an offer to
purchase the remaining shares held by the public shareholders (in Indonesia,
the more common term is “mandatory tender offer”).17 It must be noted that a
hostile (unfriendly) offer has yet to be practiced in Indonesia.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Significance, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 669-75 (1999); Allen Ferrell, Why Continental
European Takeover Law Matters, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN
EUROPE 561 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the need for takeover laws
in continental Europe); HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT OF
THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf; HIGH LEVEL
GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF THE
HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER
BIDS (2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/hlg012002.pdf [hereinafter “The Winter Report”].
14
See P.A. VAN DER SCHEE, REGULATION OF ISSUERS AND INVESTOR PROTECTION IN
THE US AND EU: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON OF THE BASICS OF SECURITIES AND
CORPORATE LAW 26-36 (2011).
15
Law 8/1995 art. 4 (Indon.).
16
In legal practice, Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 on “Pengambilalihan Perusahaan
Terbuka” is translated as “Takeover of Public Company.” Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1
(2011), available at
http://www.bapepam.go.id/old/old/E_Legal/rules/Issuer/IXH1_NEW.PDF (providing
an unofficial translation of the rule).
17
In 2007, there were 16 takeover and mandatory tender offer (MTO) transactions that
occurred in the stock exchange, but there were no Voluntary Tender Offers (VTO). In
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The next section will provide an overview of the underlying legal and
institutional framework in Indonesia, which is discussed in subsequent
sections. The third section will discuss the laws and regulations for general
acquisitions and takeovers of publicly listed companies in Indonesia. The
fourth section discusses how Indonesia’s securities takeover regulations can be
improved from the perspective of European and Dutch law. In conclusion, this
article finds that mandatory bids in Indonesia have been trending toward a
lower threshold to facilitate a more active takeover market. The share
percentage threshold for triggering a mandatory offer in Indonesia is lower
than that in the Netherlands; however, in Indonesia control can be measured by
the degree of influence within the company’s governance structure. In pricing
mandatory bids, each country has a different approach, although the
Netherlands arguably adopts a more case-specific approach through the
involvement of its judiciary. The shareholding structure of a target company in
the Netherlands is more advanced because it captures indirect structures, such
as pyramid structures or cross ownership. In addition, Indonesia can learn from
its European counterpart about the involvement of employees in a takeover
deal process. Although in the Netherlands, as in Indonesia, an employee does
not have authority to approve or reject a takeover, employees do have the right
to receive information, consultation rights, and a dispute settlement forum for
labor matters in the event of a change in corporate control. In contrast,
Indonesian law requires that a company take its employees’ interests into
account, although it does not provide detailed rules. Finally, the role of the
judiciary in Indonesia must be improved to build a fair, orderly, and efficient
capital market.

II. SECURITIES REGULATION IN INDONESIA – HISTORY AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
A. Historical Development
The Indonesian capital market existed during the Dutch colonial
period in 1912, and was reestablished in 1952 after Indonesia gained
independence.18 However, it did not become active until the 1987 financial
sector deregulation, after which certain Indonesian companies more actively
pursued public listings.19 Law 8/1995 provides the basic legal system for a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2008, there were nine takeover MTO deals and no VTO. In 2009, there were nine
takeovers and MTOs for eight (8) issuers/public companies, as well as one VTO. In
2010, the market saw 10 (ten) takeovers and MTO transactions and no VTO. In 2011,
there were 11 (eleven) takeover and MTO transactions, as well as 3 (three) VTO
transactions. Data is available in Bapepam-LK Annual Report 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010,
and 2011, all available at
http://www.bapepam.go.id/pasar_modal/publikasi_pm/annual_report_pm/index.htm.
18
M. IRSAN NASARUDIN & INDRA SURYA, ASPEK HUKUM PASAR MODAL INDONESIA
[LEGAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL MARKETS IN INDONESIA] 66-73 (LKPMK & Fakultas
Hukum UI, 2007) (Indon.).
19
After the static development of the stock exchange, in 1987 the Indonesian
government implemented the 1987 December Policy (Pakdes 87), which relaxed the
requirements for initial public offerings (IPOs) and foreign participation in the stock
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modern capital market to develop. Despite its modernized system, however,
the Indonesian capital market has been relatively exposed to external shocks.20
In 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis (“AFC”) impacted the Indonesian economy
and created a multidimensional political and social crisis.21 What started as a
currency crisis in Thailand reached Indonesia as systemic economic risk.22
This monetary crisis led to Indonesia’s adoption of a free floating exchange
rate to cope with increased demand for US dollars and, therefore, decreasing
foreign exchange reserves, which made the Rupiah fall further.23 In Indonesia,
the banking industry was affected the most because of the revocation of 16
banks’ licenses in November 1997, which created negative sentiment in the
financial market.24 The stock exchange could not escape from this collapse
either: the composite price index (indeks harga saham gabungan, IHSG) fell
from 740.8 in July 1997 to 339.5 in mid-December 1997 and market
capitalization was reduced to one-seventh of its value as compared to July
1997.25 The Crisis triggered social and political unrest in Indonesia, which
toppled the ruling “New Order” regime and ushered in a new era characterized
by a free market economy and democracy.26
After undergoing significant political, legal, and institutional reforms,
the Indonesian capital market has proven to be resilient and has enjoyed
significant growth, particularly since 2004. The 2008 global crisis temporarily

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
exchange. The following year also saw extensive financial sector deregulation for both
the banking and capital market industries, which enabled more issuers and investors to
participate in the market. See id. at 66-73.
20
The most recent example is the 2008 global financial crisis which also affected the
Indonesian capital market, including slowing down the country’s growth rate and
delaying several companies’ plans to launch initial public offerings (IPOs) due to
market uncertainty.
21
Saud Husnan, Indonesia, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE IN EAST ASIA:
A STUDY OF INDONESIA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MALAYSIA, PHILIPPINES, AND
THAILAND 1 (Juzhong Zhuang, David Edwards, & Virginia Capulong, eds., 2000).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Benny S. Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed –
Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 141, 142 (2002)
[hereinafter Tabalujan, Why Corporate Governance Failed].
25
See Mochammad Rosul, The Capital Market in Indonesia’s Economy: Development
and Prospects, in CAPITAL MARKETS IN ASIA: CHANGING ROLES FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Denis Hew & Donna Vandenbrink, eds., 2005); see generally Benny
S. Tabalujan, Corporate Governance of Indonesian Banks – The Legal and Business
Contexts, 3 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 67 (2001) (discussing the legal and business
contexts of corporate governance in the Indonesian banking sector after the Asian
Financial Crisis) [hereinafter, Tabalujan, Indonesian Banks].
26
There has been extensive literature concerning the impact of the 1997 crisis on the
Indonesian political reform. See, e.g., Hal Hill & Takashi Shiraishi, Indonesia After
the Asian Crisis, ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 123 (2007) (reviewing the political impact
of the 1997 crisis); Yuri Sato, Overview of the Seven Years’ Experiment: What
Changed and What Matters?, 43 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 3 (2005) (discussing
the changes brought on by the 1997 crisis).
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affected the stock market, but it recovered quickly. 27 The Indonesian
government recognizes that the capital market is a key pillar in supporting
Indonesia’s economic growth, the country’s long-term vision and development
plan for 2025, and its four-track (pro-poor, pro-growth, pro-job, and proenvironment) strategy.28
While the Indonesian capital market system was weak in 1997,
Indonesia suffered more from the AFC than did other Asian countries because
of its comparative failure in implementing corporate governance principles.29
As a result, after the AFC the Indonesian securities regulatory regime adopted
an approach that focused on promoting the principles of GCG. Certain studies
believe that weak corporate governance turned the external shock from the
monetary crisis into prolonged financial turmoil. For example, Benny
Tabalujan did a survey on financial and economic literature that highlighted
certain corporate governance problems in Asia, especially Indonesia, which
contributed to the crisis.30 Simon Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman offer
country-level evidence, which suggests that weak legal institutions concerning
corporate governance, particularly investor protection mechanisms, were an
essential missing factor that worsened the stock market decline during the
1997 Asian financial crisis.31 In countries with few or weak investor protection
mechanisms, net capital inflows were more sensitive to negative events that
adversely affect investor confidence. In such countries, expropriation risks
increased and expected returns on investment decreased during crises, which
made collapses in currency and stock values more likely.32 Stijn Claessens,
Simeon Djankov, and Larry Lang also found concentrated ownership and
extensive family control were very severe, particularly in Indonesia along with
the Philippines and Thailand, which condition led to owners’ excessive power
to pursue their interests at the expense of minority shareholders, creditors, and
other stakeholders.33

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27

In October 2008, the composite share price index (Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan
or IHSG) of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (Bursa Efek Indonesia) or IDX fell sharply,
forcing IDX to suspend trading for several days. The suspension started on Oct. 8,
2008 (when the IHSG dived 10.38% to the level of 1,451.669 points) and lasted until
Oct. 13, 2008. See Tabalujan, Indonesian Banks, supra note 26, at 67. For statistics of
market activity and share movement within the Indonesia Stock Exchange, please refer
to http://www.idx.co.id/.
28
This was mentioned in the speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on
Jan. 3, 2011, when the stock market opened, and during subsequent dialogues with
stakeholders of the capital market. See Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President,
Republic of Indonesia, The Opening of the Trading Day at the Indonesian Stock
Exchange
(Jan.
3,
2011),
available
at
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2011/01/03/1553.html); Dialogue with
the Stakeholders of the Indonesian Capital Market (Jan. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2011/01/03/1555.html).
29
Tabalujan, Why Corporate Governance Failed, supra note 25, at 145.
30
Id. at 150.
31
Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 141, 142-43 (2000).
32
Id. at 141-43.
33
See generally Claessen et al., supra note 13 (“The separation of ownership and
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As a result, since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the government has
paid closer attention to reforming corporate governance rules and principles:
the National Committee on Governance Policy (Komite Nasional Kebijakan
Corporate Governance or KNKG) was established under the Coordinating
Ministry of Economy in 1999 and governs Indonesian GCG policies.34 The
KNKG follows the five pillars of GCG, which are essential to improving
corporate governance practices in Indonesia: transparency, accountability,
responsibility, independence, and fairness.35 Corporate governance reforms are
contemplated in various statutes and procedures, including the general
company law, securities regulations, banking laws, and public finance laws. In
short, Indonesia has been striving to adopt fully corporate governance rules
into its legal system.
B. General Legal Framework
The enactment of Law 8/1995, which replaced Law No. 15 of 1952
(“Law 15/1952”), was Indonesia’s attempt to establish a modern legal
foundation for its capital market, and was a response to the global market and
the more sophisticated development of the global capital market industry.36 Its
enactment was in keeping with the national strategy to boost economic growth
and modernize the economy, as another major law, Law No. 1 of 1995 (“Law
1/1995”) on Limited Liability Companies, was also enacted during the same
period. Law 1/1995 was later updated and replaced by Law No. 40 of 2007
(“Law 40/2007”).37 Two government regulations were enacted to equip Law
8/1995 with operational procedures: Government Regulation No. 45 of 1995
on the Operation of Capital Market Activities (“PP 45/1995”) and Government
Regulation No. 46 of 1995 on Capital Market Investigation (“GR 46/1995”).38
In addition, Law 8/1995 grants Bapepam-LK full authority to regulate the
capital market, and Bapepam-LK since has reformed and improved Indonesian
securities regulations through enacting technical regulations. 39 Law 8/1995

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms.”).
34
See KOMITE NASIONAL KEBIJAKAN GOVERNANCE, PROFILE, available at
http://www.knkg-indonesia.com/KNKG/index.asp?ID=AB.PR (detailing the history of
the National Committee on Governance and its establishment).
35
KOMITE NASIONAL KEBIJAKAN GOVERNANCE [NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNANCE POLICY], PEDOMAN UMUM GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDONESIA
[GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR INDONESIA GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 3 (2006).
36
Law 8/1995 (Indon.). Pursuant to its elucidation, “Regulation of the Capital Market
under Law 15 of 1952, “The Emergency Law on the Securities Exchange” included in
the Statues of 1951 and 1952 (Books 79 and 67, respectively), is considered
inadequate in today’s environment, it does not contain important capital market
provisions, such as the adoption of the principle of full disclosure of material
information in a Public Offering, and other essential public safeguards. In view of the
rapid development of the economy and the globalization of business, the time is
propitious for a new law on the capital market.
37
See generally Law 40/2007 (Indon.) (concerning limited liability companies).
38
Government Regulation No. 46/1995 (Indon.).
39
At its inception in 1976, Bapepam supervised the market and served as the stock
exchange simultaneously. In 1990, Bapepam’s role as the stock exchange was
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serves as the lex generalis, or the general legal framework, for all capital
market activity. However, issuers and investors who want to engage in
Indonesian capital market activities must also pay attention to relevant lex
specialis laws that govern specific sectors or industries, such as antitrust,
foreign investment, banking, telecommunications, and mining.
Law 8/1995 affects Indonesian capital market activities in four major
ways. First, it establishes a framework for capital market activities by creating
the instruments used by the participants, and defines the roles of the market
players and supporting institutions. 40 Second, Law 8/1995 provides the
foundation for GCG principles, which includes the disclosure principle, which
protect public shareholders. 41 Third, Law 8/1995 introduces novel legal
concepts to the Indonesian legal system, such as trusts,42 misappropriating
inside information,43 which foster an “orderly, fair, and efficient” (teratur,
wajar, dan efisien) capital market.44
Fourth, Law 8/1995 establishes a new framework for the independent and
adaptive institution of the Capital Market Supervisory Authority, Bapepam,
which is the market regulator. 45 As such, Bapepam guides, regulates,
supervises and approves day-to-day market activities, commences
investigations (both administrative and criminal), and imposes sanctions.46 In
December 2005, Bapepam was merged with the Directorate General of
Financial Institutions to become Bapepam-LK, which also has the authority to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
terminated and since then it has acted only as the regulator, further reaffirmed in Law
8/1995. Ever since corporate governance reform began in Indonesia, Bapepam has
issued new rules to meet this objective, including, but not limited to, improving
disclosure requirements (Bapepam Regulation X.K.2 for financial reporting and X.K.6
for annual reporting), conflict of interest (Bapepam Regulation IX.E.1), material
transactions (Bapepam Regulation IX.E.2), rights issue (Bapepam Regulation IX.D.1),
takeovers and public bids (Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 and IX.F.1). See History of
Bapepam,
Bapepam
Online
(Mar.
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www.bapepam.go.id/old/profil/sejarah_bapepam.htm (providing a short history
of the Bapepam).
40
Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 3-5 (providing rules and regulations dealing with the
Bapepam); Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 6-17 (covering the stock exchange,
clearinghouse, and depository and settlement); Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts. 30-42
(covering securities companies and investment advisors); Law 8/1995 (Indon.) arts.
43-54 (covering supporting institutions, such as custodians, shares administrators, and
trustees).
41
Law 8/1995 art. 1(25), 75 (Indon.).
42
The limited inclusion of the concept of “trust” in the securities regulatory regime
can be inferred from the inclusion of a system of trustees (arts. 50-54), collective
custody (art. 56), and the ability to have a mutual fund collective investment contract
(art. 21), which involves a custodian bank as the trustee. Law 8/1995 (Indon.).
43
Law 8/1995 arts. 90-9 (Indon.).
44
Law 8/1995 art. 7(1) (stating that the stock exchange is established to implement a
securities market that is orderly, fair, and efficient).
45
Law 8/1995 arts. 3-5, 43-54, 64-9 (Indon.).
46
Id. art. 3(1).
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supervise the insurance and pension fund market. 47 Further, in November
2011, the Indonesian Parliament enacted Law No. 21 of 2011 (“Law 21/2011”)
concerning Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), or the Financial Service Authority
(FSA). Pursuant to Law 21/2011, FSA will become supervisor and regulator of
the capital market and financial industry, the role currently held by BapepamLK, and the banking industry, the role currently held by the Central Bank. As a
result, Bapepam-LK will be replaced by the FSA as soon as the institution is
set up.

III. INDONESIAN SECURITIES LAW TAKEOVER REGULATIONS
The takeover of a publicly listed company in Indonesia is subject to at
least three legal regimes. First, takeover is another form of acquisition under
basic company law, applicable to both privately held and publicly listed
companies. Second, for publicly listed companies, the securities regulations
enacted by the parliament, government, and Bapepam-LK, are applicable.
Third, there may be particular industry-specific or other regulations.
A. Indonesian General Company Law
Law No. 40 of 2007 on the Limited Liability Company (“Law
40/2007”) and implementing regulations, such as Government Regulation No.
27 of 1998 on Mergers, Consolidation and Acquisition of Limited Liability
Companies (“GR 27/1998”), provide the statutory framework for conducting
business as a limited liability company. Before Law 40/2007 and its
predecessor, Law 1/1995, the Indonesian Commercial Code (“ICC”) had
governed since 1847, when Indonesia a colony of the Netherlands and the
Netherlands East Indies Code of Commerce was promulgated.48
Neither the ICC nor Law 1/1995 defines an “acquisition.” However,
GR 27/1998 art. 1(3) defines an acquisition as “a legal action taken by a legal
entity or an individual person to acquire all or most of the shares of a
company, resulting in a change of control of the company.”49 Law 40/2007 art.
1(11) defines acquisition as a “legal action taken by an entity, or an individual
person, to acquire shares of a company resulting in a change of the controlling
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On December 30, 2005, the Bapepam was merged with the Directorate General of
Financial Institutions to become Bapepam-LK, and gained a supervisory role over the
insurance and pension fund market. However the name Bapepam-LK is still frequently
shortened to “Bapepam” in common usage. The organizational structure of the
Bapepam-LK is available at
http://www.bapepam.go.id/bapepamlk/organisasi/index.htm.
48
The ICC was a translation of “Wetboek van Koophandel, Staatsblad” 1847:23,
which prevailed as law after Indonesia became independent in 1945 pursuant to the
Transitional Provision in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. In 1963, the Circular
Letter of the Supreme Court No. 3 of 1963 states that the Indonesian Civil Code (as
the basis for the Indonesian Commercial Code) is no longer legally binding and serves
only as guidance for judges applying the law. SRI SOESILOWATI MAHDI, SURINI
AHLAN SJARIF & AKHMAD BUDI CAHYONO, HUKUM PERDATA [CIVIL LAW] (SUATU
PENGANTAR [AN INTRODUCTION]) 13 (2005).
49
GR 27/1998 (Indon.).
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power of a company.”50 Nonetheless, Felix Soebagjo, a scholar specializing in
Indonesian commercial law, argues that a transfer of substantial assets, which
results in a change in control of a company, can also be an acquisition.51 This
is especially true of hard asset acquisitions that also involve the procurement
of associated businesses and employees. In an asset transfer, the seller
transfers the right to control the sold “assets” to the buyer of such assets.
Therefore, certain procedures for an acquisition of assets are the same as those
applicable to a transfer of shares.52 Law 40/2007 provides the rules for share
transfers, adopting Articles 49 through 52 of Law 1/1995 with some minor
revisions and additions.53
Pursuant to Law 40/2007, an acquisition is described as a change of
control54 caused by acquiring shares that have been issued and/or to be issued
by the company either: (1) through the company’s board of directors, or (2)
directly from the shareholders.55 Any legal entity or individual can acquire
enough shares of a company to become its controlling shareholder,56 although
such acquisition is subject to other regulatory requirements, such as
restrictions on foreign ownership. 57 Standard legal procedures for share
transfers apply to acquisitions through direct purchases from existing
shareholders, such as share transfer procedures and any required third-party
approvals.58 However, when an acquisition is conducted through the board of
directors, the transaction must adhere to an “acquisition plan” created by the
prospective acquirer and jointly approved by the board of the target
company.59
As stated above, standard share transfer rules apply to direct
acquisitions from the existing shareholders; specific rules are contained in a
company’s articles of association. By law, the articles of association of a
company must specify the method of transferring the rights over shares in
accordance with the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.60 The board
of directors records the day and date of such transfer in the shareholder register
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The same definition of “acquisition” was present in the previous company law, Law
1/1995 art. 103(2) (Indon.).
51
FELIX OENTOENG SOEBAGJO, HUKUM TENTANG AKUISISI PERUSAHAAN DI
INDONESIA [LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONSOLIDATION AND MERGER OF CORPORATIONS IN
INDONESIA] 136 (Pusat Pengkajian Hukum, 2006).
52
Id.
53
Law 40/2007 arts. 48-62 (Indon.).
54
Law 40/2007 art. 125(3) (Indon.).
55
Law 40/2007 art. 125(1) (Indon.).
56
Law 40/2007 art. 125(2) (Indon.).
57
For example, Indonesia maintains a list that governs the maximum ownership in
which a foreign entity can hold shares in an Indonesian company in various business
sectors, pursuant to the Presidential Regulation regarding the negative investment list
(the latest update of which is Presidential Regulation 36/2010 (Indon.).
58
Law 40/2007 art. 125(8) (Indon.).
59
Law 40/2007 arts. 125(5), (6) (Indon.) (mandating the need of an acquisition plan,
and what must also be included in such a plan).
60
Law 40/2007 art. 55 (Indon.).
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or the special register,61 and by no later than thirty days from the record date of
the said transfer, the Minister of Law and Human Rights must also be
informed of the change in the composition of the shareholders of the company
in the shareholder register.62 If the notification is not made within the given
time frame, the Minister “may reject the application for approval or the
notification conducted based on the composition and the names of
shareholders which have not been notified.”63
A company’s articles of association may prescribe requirements
concerning transfers of rights over shares, including (a) mandatory prior offers
to holders of a particular class of shares or other shareholders as a preemptive
right;64 (b) mandatory prior approval from the company’s organs (i.e. GMS,
board of directors and/or board of commissioners); 65 and/or (c) mandatory
prior approval from the competent authority in accordance with provisions of
any other applicable regulations that may pertain to specific situations. 66
Although mandatory prior approval applies to inheritance cases, these
requirements generally do not apply if the transfer of shares is caused by an
operation of law.67
One essential and common feature in a company’s articles of
association is a preemptive right provision, known as the right of first refusal,
which is the obligation of a seller to offer their shares to the existing
shareholders of the company before transferring such shares to a third party.68
According to the law, when the articles of association require a selling
shareholder to offer his/her shares to holders of shares with a particular
classification or to the other shareholders, the offer stands for thirty days from
the date the offer is made.69 If the other shareholders do not purchase the
offered shares, the seller may offer and sell his/her shares to a third party.70
The seller is entitled to withdraw the offer after the lapse of the thirty-day
period.71 In addition, the seller is only required to offer the shares to other
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Law 40/2007 arts. 50(1)-(2) (Indon.).
Law 40/2007 art. 56(3) (Indon.).
63
Law 40/2007 art. 56(4) (Indon.).
64
Law 40/2007 art. 57(1)(a) (Indon.).
65
Law 40/2007 art. 57(1)(b) (Indon.); see also Law 40/2007 art. 1(2) (Indon.)
(defining “company organs”). The option as to which organ needs to approve such
transfer will be governed in the respective articles of association. In keeping with their
shared legal origins, the management of Indonesian companies, like their Dutch
counterparts, is split between a board of managing directors and a board of
“supervisory directors” called “commissioners” in Indonesia.
66
Law 40/2007 art. 57(1)(c) (Indon.)
67
Law 40/2007 art. 57(2) (Indon.) (revising Law 1/1995 art. 50 (Indon.)).
68
See David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STANFORD JOURNAL OF
LAW, BUSINESS, AND FINANCE, 1, 8-13 (1999); see generally Marcel Kahan, An
Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal (New York University, Ctr. for Law &
Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-99-009, 1999).
69
Law 40/2007 art. 58(1) (Indon.)
70
Id.
71
Law 40/2007 art. 58(2) (Indon.).
62
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shareholders prior to selling to a third party once.72 Sellers also must obtain
approval of either the directors or the commissioners, as specified in its articles
of association. Such approval or refusal must be given within ninety days and,
once the time period has lapsed, the board must be deemed to have approved
the share transfer.73
Finally, Indonesian company law requires a quorum in the GMS. A
GMS to approve an acquisition may be held only if at least three quarters of all
shares with voting rights are present or represented, and the resolution will be
lawful only if at least three quarters of the votes validly cast at the meeting
approve it.74 However, Law 40/2007 provides that a company’s articles of
association may require a higher quorum, a greater requirement for adoption of
the GMS resolution, or both.75 Specific rules apply to share transfers that are
subject to securities regulations.76 For example, in the acquisition of a public
company, the target public company is not obligated to obtain approval from a
GMS to be acquired, unless other laws and regulations specific to the
company’s line of business otherwise require such approval.77 This rule was
made to avoid doubt as to whether the provisions in Law 40/2007 or BapepamLK policy were applicable. Thus, although the general company law is
applicable to both privately held and publicly listed companies, publicly listed
companies are also subject to securities regulations that may prescribe
additional requirements or set aside provisions in the company law.
B. Indonesian Securities Regulations
Basic Concepts and Definitions
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 governs takeovers of public
companies in Indonesia is governed. Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 was enacted
in 2000, amended in 2002, 2008, and the current law is the 2011 amendment.78
Regulation IX.H.1 is related to the tender offer rule, known as a voluntary
public bid, which is governed by the 2011 amended version of Bapepam
Regulation IX.F.1,.79 The 2011 amendments of Regulation IX.H.1 and IX.F.180
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Law 40/2007 art. 58(3) (Indon.).
Law 40/2007 arts. 59(1)-(2) (Indon.).
74
Law 40/2007 art. 89 (Indon.).
75
Law 40/2007 art. 89(1) (Indon.).
76
Law 40/2007 art. 56(5) (Indon.).
77
Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 art. 3(2)(b) (2011) (Indon.).
78
Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 was first enacted in the Decree of Head of Bapepam
No. Kep-04/PM/2000 dated March 13, 2000 on the Takeover of Public Companies
[hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2000], and then amended and replaced
by the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. Kep-05/PM/2002 dated April 3, 2002 on the
Takeover of Public Companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2002]. A
significant change was made by Bapepam-LK, by virtue of the Decree of Head of
Bapepam-LK No. Kep-259/BL/2008 dated June 20, 2008 on the Takeover of Public
Companies [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008]. Various new
instruments were introduced in this Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008, the most
important of which was the mandatory selling requirement.
79
Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1 was first contemplated under Decree of Head of
Bapepam No. Kep-10/PM/2000 on Tender Offer dated March 13, 2000 [hereinafter
73
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make clear distinctions between the rules on takeovers and mandatory bids
(Bapepam Rule IX.H.1 2011) and the rule on voluntary bids (Bapepam Rule
IX.F.1 2011), although both regulations share similar principles.
Each version of Regulation No. IX.H.1 sets forth a similar definition
of a takeover: Takeover means “an activity, either directly or indirectly, that
cause any change in a [c]ompany’s control.”81 Under this definition, the three
essential elements of a takeover are: (1) there is an activity (or action); (2) the
activity (or action) can be exercised either directly or indirectly; and (3) the
activity (or action) causes a change in company control. The broad definition
of an “activity” can cover any activity including a voluntary public bid.
However, since there is no precedent for a voluntary bid causing a change of
control of a company in Indonesia, the term “activity” has in practice meant a
takeover resulting from share acquisitions.
In the above definition, the concept of “control” is a key factor in
determining whether a takeover has occurred in Indonesia. Bapepam
Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2002) defines “company controller” as any person
who:
1) owns 25% (twenty five percent) of a Company’s shares or
more, unless that person could prove that he does not control the
company, or 2) any person that directly or indirectly has the ability
to control a Company in a manner of: a) determining the
designation and resignation of directors and commissioners; or b)
making any changes in the Company’s Article of Association.82
This amended the previous Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1. (2000), in which
the threshold for being a company controller was 20% ownership. Meanwhile,
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 of 2008 and 2011 both define “company
controller” as “any person who owns 50% of a company’s paid-up shares or
more, or any person who directly or indirectly has the ability to determine in
any way whatsoever the management and/or policy of the public company.”83
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Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2000)] and further amended by Decree of Head of
Bapepam No. Kep-04/PM/2002 on Tender Offer dated April 3, 2002 [hereinafter
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2002)].
80
Bapepam-LK updated these two regulations by issuing: (i) the Decree of Head of
Bapepam No. 264/BL/2011 dated 31 May 2011 on the Takeover of Public Companies
[hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2011] amending Bapepam Regulation
No. IX.H.1 2008; and (ii) the Decree of Head of Bapepam No. 263/BL/2011 dated 31
May 2011 concerning Voluntary Tender Offer [hereinafter Bapepam Regulation No.
IX.F.1 2011] amending the Rule IX.F.1 2002.
81
See, e.g., Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(e) (2002) (Indon.), Bapepam
Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(e) (2008) (Indon.), and Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1
art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.).
82
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.).
83
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No.
IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2008) (Indon.).
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Based on the above, determining whether a shareholder is a company
controller can be done through the formal shareholding composition, the
quantitative approach, or the actual control of the company, the qualitative
approach. First, if using the formal shareholding composition (quantitative)
approach, there have been increases from twenty to twenty-five then to fifty
percent in the ownership threshold. The increase of this threshold is intended
to enhance market liquidity and provide wider access for investors acquiring
shares in the Indonesian stock market. 84 The takeover regulation imposes
requirements on any potential acquirer for disclosures, regulatory approvals,
and mandatory tender offers, etc. that might be burdensome for companies if
their corporate actions constitute a takeover. Therefore, from a potential
acquirer’s perspective, the threshold’s increase allows more corporate takeover
activity. The 2002 Regulation has a caveat for the twenty-five percent
threshold; namely, the act constitutes a takeover, “unless the person could
prove that he does not control the company.”85 Under this Regulation, the
acquirer has the burden of proving that the shares to be acquired will not result
in company control. This caveat was deleted after the threshold was increased
to fifty percent or more under the 2008 and 2011 Regulations.
Second, the qualitative approach, unlike the quantitative approach,
determines who has de facto control of the company without regard to the
formal shareholding composition. The 2002 Regulation’s definition of control
encompasses “any person that directly or indirectly has the ability to control a
company in the manner of: (a) determining the designation and resignation of
members of the board of directors and commissioners; or (b) making any
changes in the Company’s Article of Association.”86 However, the 2008 and
2011 Regulations broaden the definition by adding the provision that “any
person that directly or indirectly has the ability to determine in any way
whatsoever the management and/or policy of the public company” is
considered a company controller.87 The discussion of qualitative control relates
to the fact that a takeover can be a direct or indirect activity. By introducing
the concept of “indirect control,” all Regulations (2002, 2008, and 2011) have
attempted to cover parties who are not necessarily registered as the company’s
shareholder but can still exercise control over the company. For example, the
indirect control provisions may apply to an “ultimate controller”—a person
who may not own shares, but can control, determine, and greatly influence the
company’s decisions, although the Regulations do not explicitly reference this
concept.88
The 2000, 2002, 2008, and 2011 versions of Regulation IX.H.1
provide different definitions of a “person” who may be a controlling person
that consequently is compelled to make a mandatory offer. A person can be “a
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Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 consideration (a) (2008) (Indon.).
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.) (emphasis added).
86
Id.
87
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation No.
IX.H.1 art. 1(d) (2008) (Indon.).
88
For a discussion concerning beneficial/ultimate ownership across jurisdictions,
including Indonesia, see Vermeulen, supra note 13.
85
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natural person, a company [perusahaan], a legal entity, a partnership, an
association, or any Organized Group.” 89 “Natural person” refers to an
individual. Meanwhile, a company can be in any legally recognized profitseeking form, including that of a limited liability company, and it can be either
a local or foreign entity.
Mandatory Offer
When a transaction is considered to be a takeover, the party taking
over the company is required to conduct a tender offer. Under Bapepam
Regulation No. IX.F.1 (2002), “Tender Offer means an offer through the mass
media to acquire equity securities by purchase or exchange with other
Securities.”90 Pursuant to the most recent amendments in Bapepam Regulation
Rule No. IX.H.1 (2011), a mandatory tender offer no longer refers to Bapepam
Regulation Rule No. IX.F.1 (2011), which pertains exclusively to voluntary
tender offers (discussed further below). As contemplated in the 2000, 2002,
2008, and 2011 versions of Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1, in the event of a
company takeover, the new controller of the company must conduct a
mandatory tender offer for all remaining shares of the company. The shares
that must be purchased by the new controller are the shares owned by
shareholders prior to the announcement date of the proposed tender. However,
this requirement comes with several exceptions. Under Bapepam Regulation
No. IX.H.1 (2011), the following shares are excepted from the mandatory
tender offer:
a) shares owned by shareholders who have made an Takeover
transaction with the new Controller;
b) shares owned by other Parties who have obtained an offer
with the same terms and conditions from the new
Controller;
c) shares owned by other Parties who at the same time also
conduct a Mandatory Tender Offer or Voluntary Tender
Offer for the shares in the same Publicly-Listed Company;
d) shares owned by the Ultimate Shareholder; and
e) shares owned by the other Controller of the Publicly-Listed
Company.91
The mandatory tender offer requirement does not apply to a takeover
as a result of certain legal actions. The Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 2008
and 2011 versions provide that the following actions do not trigger the
mandatory tender offer requirement:
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Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 1(b) (2008) (Indon.).
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.F.1 art. 1(d) (2002) (Indon.).
91
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (3)(a)(2) (2011) (Indon.). These provisions have
also been incorporated in the previous Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2002) and
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) (Indon.). See also Bapepam Regulation No.
IX.F.1 art. 1(c) (2011) (describing “Substantial Shareholder” as any Person that
directly or indirectly owns at least 20% of the voting rights of a company’s issued
shares).
90
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1) The Takeover occurs due to marriage or inheritance;
2) The Takeover is performed by a Party who previously has no
share in the Publicly-Listed Company and the Takeover occurs
due to purchase or Takeover of the shares in the PubliclyListed Company within every 12 (twelve)-month period, in a
maximum amount of 10% (ten percent) of total outstanding
shares with valid voting rights;
3) The Takeover occurs due to the performance of duties and
authority of a government or state body or institution based on
the laws;
4) The Takeover occurs due to the direct purchase of the shares
owned and/or controlled by a government or state body or
institution as the implementation of the provision as intended
in point 3);
5) The Takeover occurs due to a court stipulation or decision
having permanent legal force;
6) The Takeover occurs due to a merger, spin-off, consolidation,
or liquidation of a shareholder;
7) The Takeover occurs due to a grant constituting a transfer or
shares without any agreement to obtain compensation in any
form whatsoever;
8) The Takeover occurs due to the existence of a certain debt
guarantee stipulated in a loan agreement, and a debt guarantee
in the context of the restructuring of the Publicly-Listed
Company stipulated by a government or a state body or
institution based on the laws;
9) The Takeover occurs due to share Takeover as the
implementation of Regulation Number IX.D.1 and Regulation
Number IX.D.4; 92
10) The Takeover occurs due to the implementation of the policies
of a government or state body or institution;
11) The Mandatory Tender Offer that, if implemented, will be
contradictory to laws and regulation; and
12) The Takeover occurs due to the implementation of a Voluntary
Tender Offer based on Regulation Number IX.F.1.93
Creeping Purchase Rule
A transaction is excluded from the mandatory tender offer requirement
if it is conducted gradually within the period of one year, with certain
limitations. This is called the “creeping share purchase rule.” Under the 2002
Regulations, that the mandatory tender offer requirement does not apply to the
purchase or acquisition of shares within a twelve month period, “in the amount
of up to five percent of the outstanding shares with valid voting rights.”94
Meanwhile, the 2008 and 2011 Regulations increased the five percent
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Bapepam Regulation No.IX.D.1 governs pre-emptive rights, while Bapepam
Regulation No.IX.D.4 governs capital increases without pre-emptive rights.
93
Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 15 (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation
IX.H.1 art. 6(a) (2011) (Indon.).
94
See Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 11(b) (2002) (Indon.).
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threshold to ten percent of the outstanding shares with valid voting rights.95 As
a result, an annual purchase of shares of up to ten percent does not trigger a
mandatory tender offer.96 However, since a shareholder of a public company
who owns more than 5% of the shares is required to disclose its identity, the
price it paid for the shares, and its intention for buying the shares,97 the other
shareholders should not be surprised if there is a change of control caused by a
creeping purchase.
Free Float Shares (In a Mandatory Offer)
Free float shares are those retained by public investors in the stock
exchange following a mandatory tender offer. Float shares are those available
for daily trading in the stock exchange. Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008)
introduced new rules regarding obligations to resell shares to maintain the
availability of float shares in the event of a takeover that triggers a mandatory
tender offer. Under the 2008 Regulations, when a takeover, or a mandatory
tender offer following a takeover, results in the new controller owning more
than 80% of the company’s shares, the new controller must transfer or float at
least 20% of the shares back to the public and the company must be owned by
at least 300 parties within two years of the offer.98 The company is exempt
from this requirement if it carries out certain corporate actions that meet the
regulatory objective.99 Such corporate action may include a rights issue or an
issuance of new shares through private placement, in which case there is no
obligation to release the shares because new shares are available for trading,
meeting the regulatory objective of making the shares available for the
public.100 This rule is expected to increase market liquidity and provide greater
opportunity for public investors to own shares of the public company after a
takeover. 101 In addition, Bapepam-LK may have established this rule to
prevent the use of tender offers as a way to “go private” or delist a company
from the stock exchange.102
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See Bapepam Regulation No. X.H.1 art. 15(b) (2008) (Indon.); Bapepam Regulation
IX.H.1 art. 6(a)(2) (2011) (Indon.).
96
Suppose A is one of the shareholders of PT XYZ, Tbk, holding 21% (twenty one
percent) of its shares. Within each of the following three years, A bought 10% (ten
percent) of the shares of the company from other shareholders of the company, until at
the end of the third year, the final shareholding composition of A was 51% (fifty one
percent). As a holder of 51% (fifty one percent) of shares of the company, A would
become a controlling shareholder, through its share ownership creeping upwards at the
rate of 10% (ten percent) per annum.
97
Bapepam Regulation No. X.M.1 (1996) (Indon.) (regulating the disclosure of
information of certain shareholders).
98
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 arts. 3-4 (2008) (Indon.).
99
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 5(c) (2008) (Indon.).
100
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 art. 5 (c) (2008) (Indon.).
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Mark Nelson & Ahmad Assegaf, Indonesia Takeover Rules: Lower Thresholds,
Fewer
Deals,
ASIA
L.
(Sept.
2008),
available
at
http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2004989/Indonesia-takeover-rules-lower-thresholdsfewer-deals.html?Print=true&Single=true.
102
Decision to be voluntarily delisted in the stock exchange is a corporate decision that
does not require Bapepam approval. There is also the possibility of delisting by virtue
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The introduction of the new sell-down rule is legally and
commercially problematic. An acquirer who is legally obligated to purchase
shares because of a mandatory tender offer will be forced to sell the shares
after two years. In addition, the acquirer will be forced to dump the shares in
the market at a discounted price if it cannot sell them within the two-year
period. This will affect the price of the shares held by the shareholders, which
will disproportionately affect the controlling shareholders because of their high
percentage ownership103 This rule prompted the Malaysian Central Bank to
revoke the approval it granted to the Malaysian-based Malayan Banking
Berhad (Maybank) when it initiated a plan to acquire a controlling stake in PT
Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk (BII) because the forced sell-down
requirement could decrease Maybank’s investment value. 104 Maybank’s
approval was reinstated after Bapepam promised to relax the requirement if the
sell-down would adversely impact BII’s share price.105
In response, the 2011 updated version of Bapepam Regulation No.
IX.H.1 (2011) stipulates the conditions under which Bapepam-LK can prolong
the time period for the mandatory sell down of shares to relax the sell-down
requirements. The time extension may be given if:
1) the Composite Share Price Index (IHSG) on the Stock Exchange
decreases by more than 10% (ten percent) in 3 (three) consecutive
exchange days;
2) the Stock Exchange on which the Publicly-Listed Company’s
shares are listed and traded is closed;
3) the trading of the Publicly-Listed Company’s shares on the Stock
Exchange is stopped;
4) natural disaster, war, riot, fire, and/or strike that significantly
affect the business continuity of the Publicly-Listed Company;
5) the share price during the retransfer period is never equal to or
higher than the price of the Mandatory Tender Offer; and/or
6) the new Controller has made efforts to retransfer the shares but the
obligation as intended in letter a and/or letter b is not fulfilled.106
Offer Price
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of the order of the stock exchange. See, e.g., IDX Rule I-I on Delisting and Relisting
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Price formulation is another main issue in the Indonesian regulations
on mandatory offers. The price of a mandatory offer is essential in takeover
regulations because the public must receive the same price as that which the
acquirer offered to the controlling shareholder. In principle, there is a general
shift from determining offer price by the “highest price” to the “average
highest price” approach. At first, Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2000) does not
distinguish between the prices for direct and indirect takeovers.107 However,
the general rule is that the price is determined by the highest share price within
a certain period.108 Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2002), which has adopted the
same approach, improved this rule by providing requirements differentiating
between direct and indirect takeovers for determining the price of the tender
offer.109 Despite the distinction, both direct and indirect takeover will cause a
mandatory tender offer, the price of which is set pursuant to the highest price
within the last 90 days prior to the date of the announcement of the deal.
Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 (2008) and (2011) significantly
amended the previous regulations by adopting the average highest price rule.110
The 2011 Regulation states that the price is the higher of (a) the average of the
highest daily trading prices on the ISX within the ninety-day period before the
announcement of the tender offer or the negotiation and (b) the takeover price.
111
This amends the 2002 Regulation, in which the price was the higher of (a)
the highest trading price on ISX within the ninety-day period before the
negotiation announcement and (b) the takeover price.112 In 2011, Bapepam
synchronized the rule concerning voluntary tender offers by adopting the
average highest price approach. Therefore, the rules for mandatory and
voluntary public bids use the average highest price of the traded stocks.113
There are at least two significant changes in the new rules. First, the
announcement date under the 2008 Regulation can be made either at the
commencement of negotiation that may result in a takeover or at the
completion of the takeover deal. This affects the price of the tender offer and,
therefore, acquirers must decide strategically when to announce the deal, and
contemplate how it may affect the tender offer price. Second, the 2008
Regulation adopts the “average highest price” standard instead of the “highest
price” standard. This approach reduces the price for a tender offer, which
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arguably can encourage a more active takeover market since potential
acquirers prefer lower prices. In addition, he highest price standard can reduce
the chance of market manipulation to create an artificially high price for tender
offers by leaking inside information. While information leakage is difficult to
monitor in Indonesia, the tender offer price is determined by the average
highest price and, therefore, averaging the highest price can disperse the
impact of leaked information.
Negotiation and Timing
An important consideration with respect to the takeover of a public
company and its subsequent mandatory tender offer requirement is when to
disclose the process to the general public. Such information is crucial because
the public will react to the takeover plan, and such reaction will affect the
share price. If the public views the takeover plan positively, the share price
may increase. Conversely, if the public views the takeover negatively, the
price of the shares may go down. Therefore, the decision to disclose the
takeover plan may impact the price of the shares as well as the price of the
mandatory tender offer.
Pursuant to the 2000 and 2002 Regulations, when a potential acquirer
commences takeover negotiations it must disclose the process even though the
deal might fall through. 114 How is the “start” of a negotiation to be
determined? The Regulations did not explain whether a short verbal
conversation between a director of a prospective company and a director of a
prospective target company constitutes “the start of negotiations,” or whether
it had to be done in a more formal way, such as the signing of a memorandum
of understanding.
The 2008 and 2011 versions of Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1
introduced more flexibility into the timing of a takeover announcement. Since
the provision regarding the announcement at the start of the negotiation is
optional rather than mandatory,115 a prospective controller may announce a
mandatory offer upon the completion of an acquisition of a controlling
interest. This flexibility allows the acquirer to choose whether to announce the
mandatory tender offer during the negotiation stage or wait until the
completion of the takeover. The acquirer must consider the effect of its
disclosure strategy on the share price in order to obtain the best value. For
instance, if the acquirer announces the takeover and subsequent plan of a
mandatory tender offer at the negotiation stage, the share price of such
mandatory tender offer will then be calculated (locked) based on such date and
it will be easier for the acquirer to predict and determine the tender offer price.
However, if the announcement of a mandatory tender offer is made only after
the completion of a takeover, share price might increase sharply, which in turn
might increase the price of the mandatory tender offer shares pursuant to the
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regulation. Therefore, the acquirer must consider when to disclose the
information.
If a prospective candidate announces a plan to conduct a takeover at
the start of a negotiation, every subsequent material development in the
negotiations must be reported on a regular basis, and at the latest at the end of
the second day after such a development occurs.116 The mandatory tender offer
must commence no later than the end of the second business day after the
company takeover occurs, 117 or at the latest 180 days after the
announcement.118
Anti-Takeover Defense
Regulations concerning anti-takeover measures are relevant to hostile
takeovers, that is, public offers proceeding without the consent of the board of
directors of the target company. Hostile offers have not been practiced in
Indonesia because most takeover deals were preceded by share acquisitions
that led to mandatory tender offers.119 However, in the event of a voluntary
tender offer, pursuant to Bapepam-LK Regulation IX.F.1 (2011), a statement
supporting or discouraging a voluntary offer may be made by the target
company, an affiliate of the target company, a competing offeror, or those who
disclose information or express professional opinions.120 In addition, the board
of directors or board of commissioners of the target company can issue a
written statement, but only if there is evidence that the information contained
in the offer statement is incorrect or deceiving.121 Both of these types of
statements must be published in two nationwide newspapers at least ten days
before the end of the voluntary tender offer period.122 Finally, there is a general
prohibition against the target company carrying out any deal or activity that
might frustrate the voluntary tender offer during the offer period,123 but there is
no concrete list of what constitutes such action.
The Role of the Supervisory Authority
The competent supervisory authority of the Indonesian capital market
is Bapepam-LK, which authority, as of December 31, 2012, has been
transferred to OJK.124 During its administration, Bapepam-LK has played an
effective role in supervising the Indonesian capital market. With regard to
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administrative authority and criminal investigative role over market
participants, there is no significant change made by shifting authority from
Bapepam-LK to the OJK or the Indonesian FSA. Law 21/2011 concerning the
OJK mostly revises the governance structure (i.e. nomination and
accountability) to establish regulatory independence. 125 At present, the
authority governing the capital market pursuant to the new OJK governance is
no longer under the government’s finance ministry; rather, OJK is an
independent entity, the members of which are selected by the parliament. As a
regulator, Bapepam-LK/OJK retains regulatory authority, administrative
enforcement authority, and, to a certain extent, criminal investigation
authority.
First, as part of its administrative authority, Bapepam-LK/OJK can
commence an administrative inquiry to maintain the integrity of the market. It
can do so by requesting information from market participants, gathering and
collecting documentary evidence, or instructing that market participants take
certain actions to settle conflicts in the market. If a market participant fails to
comply with the rules set out by Bapepam-LK, the institution has the power to
impose administrative sanctions. Bapepam-LK/OJK has authority to approve
both mandatory and voluntary public offers and its relevant requirements, such
as price setting and the sell down rule, 126 and supervise all information
disclosed during the process.127
Second, Bapepam-LK/OJK can impose the following administrative
sanctions: written warnings, monetary fines, limitations on business activities,
suspensions of business activities, revocations of business licenses,
annulments of approval, and annulments of registration.128 Third, pursuant to
Law 8/1995 art. 101(3), Bapepam-LK, as transferred to OJK, can serve as a
criminal investigator with the authority (1) to receive reports, notices, or
complaints regarding potential criminal activities; (2) to investigate the
validity of reports regarding crimes in the capital market; (3) to investigate
certain individuals considered to be alleged perpetrators of crimes; (4) to
subpoena, request statements, and gather information or collect evidence
regarding crimes; (5) to conduct investigations in any place deemed to have
stored evidence on accounts, statements, or any document, and to seize them to
serve as evidence of a crime; (6) to request expert statements; and (7) to
commence and terminate the investigation procedure.129
C. Other Relevant Regulations
A takeover is subject to legal regimes other than the basic company
law and securities regulations. Shareholders that are foreign entities are
governed under the foreign investment law and sector-specific regulations and
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my face foreign investment restrictions. In addition, takeover deals are subject
to competition laws and employment laws.
Foreign Investment Restrictions
Foreign direct investment in Indonesia is regulated by Law No. 25 of
2007 on Investment (“Law 25/2007”) and its implementing regulations, which
were issued by the Investment Coordinating Board (“BKPM”) in accordance
with its mandate. BKPM is the appointed regulator of direct investments in
Indonesia, has focused mainly on government efforts to promote investment,
as well as to regulate and resolve investment issues in Indonesia.130
Recently, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 36 of
2010, which determines what business sectors are open or closed to foreign
investors and, if open, to what extent Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) is
permitted—also known as the “Negative List”.131 The new Negative List is the
first and most important regulation, which any foreign investor contemplating
investment in Indonesia must consult.132 If the companies participating in the
contemplated merger and acquisition (“M&A”) have business fields listed on
the Negative List as being closed to foreign investment, the foreign investor
cannot invest in such field in Indonesia. However, if the business is one that is
“conditionally” open to foreign investment, investment is permitted but the
contemplated M&A is limited by the restriction on share ownership as
provided by the Negative List.133
Most private foreign investments in Indonesia are administered and
supervised by the BKPM, which inter alia administers the application of the
Negative List to foreign investment approvals. Most matters relevant to M&A
transactions must be reported to, and require obtaining approval from, the
Chairman of the BKPM. In addition, Bapepam-LK regulates publicly listed
companies. However, unlike shares regulated under the foreign direct
investment scheme, shares traded on the capital market are not classified by
their holders, regardless of whether they are local or foreign parties. 134
However, in practice there has been uncertainty about when a tender offer
obligation did not follow the Negative List ownership requirements.135
Competition Law
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Certain provisions of Law No. 5 of 1999 on the Ban of Monopolistic
Practices and Unfair Business Practices (“Law 5/1999” or “Antimonopoly
Law”) deal specifically with mergers and acquisitions. Pursuant to Article 28
of Law 5/1999, mergers and acquisitions are prohibited in Indonesia if they
result in monopolistic or unfair trade practices. Therefore, all efforts must be
made to ensure that any contemplated M&A transaction does not give rise to a
monopolistic or unfair trade or business practice. Law 5/1999 uses the 50%
market share standard as presumptive of a monopoly,136 the 75% market share
as presumptive of an oligopoly,137 and 50% individual market share or 75%
group market share as determinative of a dominant position, unless the party
with the shares does not abuse their dominant position.138 The Indonesian
competition authority, the KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha), is
responsible for supervising market competition and anti-competitive behavior
in Indonesia.139
In July 2010, the Indonesian government issued Government
Regulation No. 57 of 2010 on the Merger or Consolidation and Acquisition of
Enterprise Share, which may Result in Monopolistic Practices and Unfair
Business Competition (“GR 57/2010”). GR 57/2010 provides the basic legal
framework for competition laws applicable to M&A transactions. Since then,
the KPPU has issued several rules (“KPPU Rules”), per the mandate of the
Anti-Monopoly Law, 140 which contain amended provisions relating to the
consultation and pre-notification requirements for M&A transactions.
Previously, there was only a voluntary pre-notification process for the parties
involved in an M&A. Under GR 57/2010 and the procedures under the KPPU
Rules, the voluntary pre-notification process has been replaced with a
required, pre-transaction consultation procedure and a more stringent thirtyday post-notification requirement after completion of the contemplated deal.141
GR 57/2010 states that such post-notification requirement must be
fulfilled by a company conducting any M&A transaction in which the
combined total value of assets of the companies concerned is more than 2.5
trillion Rupiah, or in which the combined total turnover of the companies
concerned is more than 5 trillion Rupiah. 142 Furthermore, GR 57/2010
stipulates that a Bank conducting an M&A transaction is required to submit a
post-notification of such transaction to the KPPU if the total value of assets of
the bank concerned is more than 20 trillion Rupiah.143 Noncompliance with
this requirement will give result in the imposition of administrative
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penalties.144 As a result, after receiving such post-notification, the KPPU will
conduct an assessment and determine whether the M&A transaction violates
the Antimonopoly Law, using the market concentration, market entry barriers,
potential for unfair trade behavior, efficiency, and/or bankruptcy criteria.145
While the KPPU’s opinion is not binding, under Article 47(2)(e) of
Law 5/1999, the KPPU has authority to cancel an M&A transaction if such
transaction has elements of monopolistic or unfair trade practices.146 Hence,
potential acquirers contemplating takeover transactions should conduct and
file a consultation with the KPPU prior to the completion of a contemplated
transaction to limit the cancellation risk.
Employment Law
Law No. 13 of 2003 on Employment (“Law 13/2003”) provides the
framework for employee and employer rights during an M&A.147 In theory,
since an M&A is related only to a change in ownership of or control over a
company, it does not affect the employees’ status. In practice, an employee
may continue working for the company after an acquisition if the posttransaction company prolongs or renews the employee’s work contract. If the
contract is renewed, the employee will be terminated from the company pretransaction and re-hired by the surviving company under new terms and
conditions.
If an employee does not wish to be employed by the surviving company,
he or she has the right to refuse new employment. Thus, an employee can
resign from the company and be entitled to receive a special severance
payment, long service payment package, and/or other compensation, such as
unused annual leave or housing allowance.148 Law 13/2003 does not specify
the ownership percentage that triggers these entitlements; rather, it refers to a
change of ownership.149 Further, Law 13/2003 is silent on whether the change
of control is only direct, or whether it includes indirect changes of control.150
There is a risk that the company’s employees or their union will take the
position that any change of ownership will qualify under Article 163(1) even if
there is less than a fifty percent change in shareholding. However, even if a
new shareholder is not a controlling shareholder, any substantial change in
management and employment policies will trigger Article 163(1) because such
changes will directly or indirectly affect the employees.
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Moreover, under Article 163(2) of Law 13/2003, the employers of both
the acquiring and target companies have the right to terminate or maintain
employment in the event of a change in a company’s status, merger, or
consolidation, subject to the payment of severance and long service payment
as provided by Article 163(2).151 In practice, the rights of employees affected
by M&A transactions are governed by collective labor agreement provisions
entered into by and between the company and the company’s labor union.152
Transfers of corporate ownership do not affect the validity of a collective labor
agreement because such agreements prevail until their date of termination.153

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR
INDONESIA
This article will use the Netherlands’ securities regulations as a
benchmark to analyze whether the Indonesian securities regulations have
adopted rules according to best practices. Since the Indonesian legal system
originated from the Dutch colonial era, the two systems share commonalities
in their corporate and securities legal structures.
A. Laying Down the Foundation for Comparing Takeover Rules
To provide a proper comparative study from which solutions for
improving Indonesia’s takeover rules can be derived, this article will begin by
analyzing the general legal and economic framework of takeovers.
An acquisition or takeover is characterized by the change of control
within a company. Therefore, Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt use the term
“control transaction” to define any transaction in which the acquirer attempts,
through offers made to the company’s existing or current shareholders, to
acquire sufficient voting shares to give the offeror control over the company
by appointing their “nominees to the board of that company.”154 Davies and
Hopt differentiate a “control transaction” from other forms of change in a
company’s corporate control in two ways. First, a control transaction lacks a
corporate decision because the acquirer initiates the transaction, unlike, for
example, a merger, which is a joint corporate decision.155 Second, a control
transaction has an external party—the acquirer—that will take control of the
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company, 156 which may give rise to competing interests among the acquirer,
the existing shareholders, and the management boards of the target company.
In practice, there are various ways to conduct a takeover, such as through
private and direct contract between the acquirer and a small number of
(controlling) shareholders, through the purchase of shares on the market, and
by a general, public offer to all shareholders of the target—all of these
methods face the same problem.
There are corporate structures under which a takeover may take place,
including no controlling shareholder, a controlling shareholder, and the impact
of non-shareholders.157 With each of these structures, the underlying legal
issue remains the same: where is the locus of decision-making regarding a
takeover deal? In other words, who has the final say, and how does that
decision impact affected parties who are not involved in the decision-making
process? This issue reflects the central tension of a takeover, that the basic
principle of free transferability of shares versus recognition that such transfer
of control has various consequences for the target company and related
parties.158
First, if there is no controlling shareholder or ownership is dispersed
among the shareholders, the shareholders cannot influence the company.159
The locus of decision-making of such a target company is not among the
shareholders, but within the boards of management. In a company with this
structure, a decision to change corporate control will be heavily influenced by
the target board’s incentives.160 The boards may insist on going forward with
the takeover deal or may block the transaction by making the target company
less attractive because the deal might affect their jobs, i.e. they may be
promised better remuneration or the deal might threaten their job stability.161
Ultimately, the decision to sell rests with the shareholders who own shares of
the target company. However, board members who deal with the day-to-day
operations of the company can strongly influence shareholders’ decisions
because board members have better information regarding the company.162
Second, company control may be held by a small percentage of
shareholders or a group of shareholders known as the “block-holder.” The
acquirer is likely to come to an agreement with the block-holder first and then
decide whether, and on what terms, to make a general offer to the noncontrolling shareholders. 163 In such a case, issues may arise between the
majority shareholders, as the controlling entities of the company, and the
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minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder may sell the company to an
acquirer whom the minority shareholders prefer less, and this decision may
affect the minority shareholders’ treatment. 164 In addition, the controlling
shareholder may engage in rent-seeking activities, or “tunneling,” by
transferring assets out of the company, siphoning off profits to escape
creditors, and propping up troubled firms in a group using loan guarantees by
other listed group members.165
Since minority shareholders face such challenges, they should be
protected by the mandatory tender offer rule. When corporate control changes
from the controlling shareholder to the acquirer, the acquirer must extend an
offer to the remaining shareholders at a price that includes the premium given
to the previous controlling shareholder. As a result, the public/minority
shareholders sell their shares at a premium price higher than that regularly
traded in the market, although the setting of the premium price may vary
across jurisdictions. Therefore, the mandatory bid rule distributes of wealth or
control premium making what was exclusive to the controller enjoyed by all
shareholders. This makes the price for corporate control more expensive,
potentially deters efficient bidding and creates an inefficient allocation of
resources, but gives public shareholders greater protection.166 Koen Geens and
Carl Clottens write, “[t]he full bid requirement causes the bidder to internalize
[sic] all the external effects that result from the extraction of private benefits.
This not only improves the competitive position of a value-enhancing bidder
but even places all bidders on an equal footing.”167
Finally, the protection of the non-shareholders with an interest in the
outcome, or the “stakeholders,” is another issue. Two important stakeholder
classes who are greatly affected by takeover transactions are the employees
and creditors of the target company. In practice, rules that protect the interests
of the stakeholders can take various forms, including creditor protection,168 or
employee protection.169 The extent of the employees’ involvement depends on
their role in corporate decision-making—whether they are closely engaged
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with the board, potentially by having a labor union or a representative on the
board.
This article will now analyze the Dutch legal system, which
incorporates the EU Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Rules. In addition to
the shared legal tradition between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the EU
Takeover Directive that incorporates the mandatory bid rule is relevant
because Indonesia adopts a similar approach.
B. General Overview of Dutch Securities Regulations and the EU
Takeover Directive
During the 1990s, Dutch securities law recognized many types of selfregulation, although many of these have been replaced by statutory
regulations. At present, Dutch securities regulations, including public
offerings, can be found in the Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het
financieel toezicht; “AFS”), enacted on January 1, 2007, and decrees issued
under this Act (e.g., Besluit openbare biedingen, Wft, the Decree on Public
Offers).170 The AFS compiles all the rules and requirements that apply to the
financial markets and their supervision. The AFS supervises Dutch financial
institutions, such as banks, insurers, and collective investment schemes. In
addition, the Competition Act,171 the Works Council Act, 172 and the SERMerger Code of 2000, 173 all apply to takeover deals. The Dutch public
takeover law applies when a public offer is made or being prepared for
securities of Dutch limited liability companies that are allowed to trade on the
regulated Dutch markets, such as the Eurolist Amsterdam.174
The AFS also includes provisions to implement the EU Takeover
Directive, as incorporated in the AFS since October 28, 2007, and Article
2:359A of the Dutch Civil Code (BW). 175 EU Directive 25/2004/EC on
Takeover Bids provides the common principles, general requirements, and
minimum standard of rules that all members of the European Union must
follow during takeover bids for publicly listed companies traded on a regulated
market. 176 The EU Directive must be adopted by each member state by
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implementing rules in accordance with each country’s legal system.177 In its
Directive Recital, the regulatory objectives of the Directive are specifically
contemplated, including legal certainty across EU member states or the
harmonization of takeover rules, protection of the shareholder interests,
especially minority shareholders, employees and other stakeholders, and the
freedom and primacy of shareholders to prevent of management board actions
against a bid.178 The Directive aims to balance the freedom of shareholders
with the long-term protection of the company.179
Several key principles of the Takeover Directive have been adopted by
the Dutch legal system. First is the mandatory bid rule, which aims to protect
minority shareholders by compelling the acquirer to offer an “equitable price”
to the other shareholders.180 Squeeze out and sell out rules are other major
principles in the Takeover Directive.181 Post-bid defensive measures, namely
the “board neutrality rule” and the “break-through rule,” introduced in the
Takeover Directive are relevant in the Netherlands, especially in litigation on
takeover bids.182 High profile cases in the Netherlands such as Rodamco, ABN
AMRO, Stork, and ASMI shape the guiding rule for the permissibility of
defense measures against takeover bids.183 Finally, the Directive recognizes the
need to protect other stakeholders, including the target company’s employees’
rights by promoting their right to information and their right to issue an
opinion.184
The Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële
Markten or “AFM”) is the supervisory body of the Dutch financial market, and
is responsible for approving all takeover bids in the Netherlands. Pursuant to
Section 5:74 (1) of the AFS, “[n]o party may make a public takeover bid for
securities admitted to trading on a regulated market that has been licensed in
accordance with Section 5:26(1), unless by an offer document approved by the
Authority for the Financial Markets . . . .”185 Furthermore, the Dutch judiciary,
the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, has been playing
an active role in developing the rules for takeovers. The Enterprise Division
may decide whether to, extend the period of a mandatory bid after considering
all relevant interests, 186 exempt the mandatory bid, 187 or order a takeover
bid.188 This Court can also, at the request of the target company, suspend the
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exercise of voting rights of the new controlling shareholder, prohibit the new
controlling shareholder from taking part in a general meeting of shareholders,
order a temporary transfer of management of shares, or suspend or nullify a
decision reached by a general meeting of the shareholders.189 In addition, the
Enterprise Division can order the new controlling shareholder to reduce its
ownership if it violates the rule on market concentration or fair competition
objectives.190 If there is a dispute about setting a fair or equitable price for a
mandatory bid, the Court can determine a price that is considered fair.191
C. Lessons from the European and Dutch Takeover Rules
A full assessment on the efficacy of the Indonesian takeover law from
a comparative law perspective is best served by regime-specific comparison, in
this case being the European and Dutch takeover regime. This article
highlights several aspects that are worth comparing: the definitions of
takeovers and public bids, the rules governing a mandatory bid, including
pricing, disclosure of control structure, the engagement of stakeholders, and
the role of the supervisory authority and the judiciary. Issues such as hostile
takeovers and defensive mechanisms are less relevant because the Indonesian
legal practice has never experienced such transactions.
Definition of “Bid”
First, this article will compare the terms that are used in the
Netherlands and Indonesia regarding a takeover bid. In the Netherlands, the
general offering rules recognize several different types of offers or bids, the
most popular of which is the full offer.192 In a full offer, the offeror makes an
announcement, which contains the offer price or stock that is traded, that it
aims to acquire all securities of the target company—that is, all issued and
outstanding shares of the relevant class.193 In general, the offeror may offer
cash for the securities of the target company, but it can also conduct an
“exchange offer” in which securities are offered in exchange for the securities
of the target company.194 The offeror is usually required to issue new securities
to make an exchange offer. A full offer becomes a mandatory bid when there
is a change of control of the company, which triggers the mandatory offer
obligation.195 AFS Section 1:1 defines a “public takeover bid” as “a bid for
securities as referred to in Section 217(1) of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code,
made by means of a public announcement, or an invitation to make a bid for
securities, whereby the bidder has the intention to acquire these securities.”196
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An offeror can make a partial offer, which is an unconditional and
irrevocable offer for securities to acquire no more than thirty percent of shares
with voting rights, both issued and outstanding, and, therefore, there is no
change of control.197 This offer is an easier way for an offeror to buy a
substantial amount of securities compared to normal trading, although block
trading is also an option.198 A partial offer may not result in the acquisition of
more than thirty percent of the issued share capital of the target company,
which would be a change of control and the offeror would be required to make
a bid for all of the shares. 199
Finally, there is the tender offer, which is an invitation to owners of
securities of the target company by the bidder to offer their securities for a
price to be determined by the existing shareholders themselves.200 This offer is
restricted to acquisitions of less than thirty percent of the voting securities of
the target company. 201 A tender offer allows the offeror to invite the
shareholders to sell their shares for a price set by each of the tendering
shareholders. Furthermore, a tender offer stipulates the number or percentage
of shares to be acquired by the offeror, and is addressed to all holders of the
class of shares to which the offer relates.202 However, the tender offer is
uncommon in the Netherlands:203 since its introduction, the only successful
tender offer was issued by Bergson Holdings N.V. for a part of the ordinary
shares of Hunter Douglas N.V.204
Meanwhile, the takeover of a public company in Indonesia is
commonly conducted through an acquisition of that company by the
controlling shareholder, which leads to a mandatory bid obligation, or a
“mandatory tender offer” (“MTO”). There are different procedures for
conducting an MTO and conducting a general public offer, or a Voluntary
Tender Offer (“VTO”).205 In practice, VTO transactions in Indonesia have not
resulted in a change of control, 206 which is similar to the Dutch partial offer

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
197

CALKOEN ET AL., supra note 192, at 1-2.
Id.
199
Id. (“Partial offerings are mainly issued to: (1) acquire a substantial interest in a
target company for strategic considerations against a purchase price per share, which
should be at the same level as the stock exchange rate; (2) to explore the willingness of
target shareholders to sell their shares; and (3) to intervene in a public offer of a
competitor of the offeror.”).
200
Id. at 2.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
See Karel Frielink, Public Take-over Rules in the Netherlands and the Netherlands
Antilles,
Karel’s
L.
Blog
(Jan.
11,
2006),
http://www.curacaolaw.com/2006/01/11/public-take-over-rules-in-the-netherlands-and-the-netherlandsantilles/ (discussing this transaction).
205
MTO is governed under Bapepam Regulation IX.H.1 (2011) (Indon.), while VTO
is governed under Bapepam Regulation IX.F.1 (2011).
206
See BAPEPAMLK, ANNUAL REPORT PASAR MODAL (2011), available at
http://www.bapepam.go.id/pasar_modal/publikasi_pm/annual_report_pm/index.htm
(providing reports and statistics on transactions and corporate actions that have
198

!

2013]

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INDONESIAN

117

scheme. Therefore, the shared legal practices between Indonesia and the
Netherlands are relevant for mandatory bids (MTOs in Indonesia) and partial
offers (VTOs in Indonesia), but the Dutch-style full offers and tender offers
have never occurred in Indonesia.
Mandatory Bids
As mentioned above, takeovers in Indonesia are commonly done by
acquisition of the public company, which triggers the mandatory bid
requirement. In such cases, an offer becomes mandatory if it causes a change
of “control.” Hence, the definition of “control” is significant in Indonesia.
Similarly, a mandatory offer due to change of control is recognized under
Dutch law, although a change of control can occur in the Netherlands by
launching a full offer, a practice that is not recognized in Indonesia. The
mandatory offer requirements protect minority shareholders by preventing
them from being expropriated through an unfavorable deal.207 While Indonesia
introduced this concept in 2000, the Netherlands enacted the mandatory offer
requirement in 2007, after adopting the Takeover Directive.
The Takeover Directive does not define control, but AFS rules
governing a mandatory bid provides guidance for the concept of effective
control. Under Dutch law, a person is deemed to have effective control if that
person has directly or indirectly assumed 30%, or more, of the voting rights in
a Dutch limited liability company, which is incorporated in the Netherlands
and whose shares or certificates are traded on the regulated market.208 Most
other European countries have their threshold for the trigger of mandatory bid
around 30 to 30 1/3% percent.209 Compared to the thirty percent threshold in
the Netherlands, the threshold in Indonesia has gone from twenty percent in
2000 to twenty-five percent in 2002, and increased to fifty percent after the
enactment of Bapepam Regulation No. IX.H.1 in 2008.210 This increase is
attributed to the regulatory objective to increase takeovers in Indonesia.211
The change of control threshold can be achieved via indirect control of
the company, which may meet the thirty percent requirement in the
Netherlands. This is possible when a shareholder of a company acquires shares
in a company that has shares of the company in which the shareholder also has
a stake. Pursuant to AFS, a shareholder with indirect control is “any party that,
either on its own or together with persons with which it acts in joint
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consultation, acquires, either directly or indirectly, predominant control over a
public limit company . . . shall make a public takeover bid . . . .”212 The
indirect action approach is recognized in the Indonesian regulation describing
the definition of takeover as a form of direct or indirect action that causes
change of control.213
Further, Dutch law limits control based on the quantitative threshold
of thirty percent, while in Indonesia there is the possibility of changing
corporate control based on the degree of influence in the company’s
management. If a person can influence the corporate management and policy,
it is deemed to be a controller.214
In conclusion, while both Indonesia and the Netherlands recognize the
mandatory bid requirement, the impact on its regulatory objectives, such as
protecting minority shareholders, might be different. For example, the
Indonesian regulations are less protective of minority shareholders because the
control threshold is 50%, rather than the 30% threshold in the Netherlands.
However, the Indonesian concept of assessing control based on the degree of
involvement in the company’s management can protect the minority
shareholders, which is a concept not recognized in the Netherlands.
Determining the Price for a Mandatory Bid
The mandatory bid rule is intended to distribute the control premium
to all shareholders. Therefore, the offer price must be higher than the publicly
traded price. In the Netherlands, the mandatory offer shall be made pursuant to
a “fair” or “equitable” price (billijke prijs).215 The price is fair when it is “the
highest price paid by the offeror or the persons with which it acts in joint
consultation for securities of the same category or class as that to which the
mandatory bid relates during the year preceding the announcement of the
mandatory bid.”216 In other words, the offer price is determined by the highest
price for which the offeror bought the same class of shares in the year prior to
the action that triggered the mandatory bid obligation. The AFS states that the
fair price shall be specified by decree if the offeror bought the shares for a
price in excess of the fair price, or if the offeror did not acquire such shares
within the year before the mandatory bid.217 If the offeror has not bought
shares before, the offer price is the average list price over the last year.218
As mentioned above, Indonesian law introduced the mandatory offer
rule earlier than the Dutch regulation.219 Since introducing this rule, Indonesia
has changed the price formula from using the “highest price” to using the
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“average highest price” of the publicly traded shares on the stock market.220
The formula change arguably facilitates a more active takeover market because
it, allows the offeror to offer a lower premium price to the shareholders and
thus makes takeovers less costly. Furthermore, by setting the price based on
the average highest price within a certain period, any potential excess price
due to volatility or a sharp increase of share price due to information leakage
will be reduced.221 In contrast, Dutch law, in accordance with the EU Takeover
Directive, does not rely on the price movement in the stock market, but on the
previous offer of the acquirer.222
Despite these different approaches, both the regulations in Indonesia
and the Netherlands aim to offer a premium control price to the shareholders.
The main difference between the two countries is the role of the judiciary in
the Netherlands (see above discussion) in determining the equitable price,
should any party object to the mandatory offer price.223 This makes price
setting more flexible and allows it to be assessed on a case-by-case basis
because it is more adaptable to a creative legal structure that is designed to
lower the mandatory offer price.
Disclosure Regarding Control Structure
The acquirer’s identity and the deal structure are important issues that
heavily impact investment decisions, especially those made by public
shareholders. The EU Takeover Directive requires certain information to be
disclosed in a takeover bid, such as the terms of the bid, the identity of the
offeror, the financing of the takeover, and share classification.224 Furthermore,
the target company is subject to extensive disclosure requirements,225 which
address the control structure of the target company, such as the existing capital
structure, the deviation from the standard of voting rights equal cash-flow
(dividend) rights by virtue of share classification or any restriction on rights
over shares, indirect shareholdings, and the power of the board members.
According to Vermeulen, the disclosure of control and ownership information
enables investors to make well-informed choices about their investments and
discourages deviations from the standard “one-share-one-vote” rule.226 This
rule complements the already existing EU Transparency Directive,227 which
already provides a framework for periodical and transactional disclosure in
general. Although disclosing information does not directly prevent the
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controlling shareholder from expropriating the rights of the minority
shareholder, as in the case of mandatory bid, Erik Vermeulen argues that
disclosure and transparency are “crucial to effectively regulate the financial
market, while at the same time, discouraging market manipulation and abusive
tactics.”228
The identity of the new controller may depend on the concept of
“person” under Indonesian law and “acting in concert” as defined by the EU
Takeover Directive. These concepts help identify when a party, which can
consist of a group of parties, possesses indirect control of a company. Pursuant
to the EU Takeover Directive, if one person has made an agreement with one
or more shareholders regarding the governance of the company, they can be
considered a single controlling shareholder.229 This rule has been adopted by
Dutch law, which adds the definition of “acting in concert.”230
Disclosures of information can be seen from the perspective of the
acquirer, the target company, and the bid itself. In Indonesia, Bapepam
Regulation IX.H.1 (2011) aims to introduce better disclosure of information
about control, and focuses more on the acquirer and the terms of the bid. For
example, the terms of the mandatory bid are part of the information that the
offeror is required to make available.231 If the acquirer is a company, it must
disclose its establishment, line of business, capital structure, board structure,
and the identity of its shareholders, including the beneficial owner and any of
its affiliates.232 The rule defining a “person” also incorporates not only one
entity, but also parties in an association or organized group, which can
constitute a single controller. 233 There is no further explanation for what
constitutes an “organized group,” so the regulator has discretion when
deciding whether to approve a bid.
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After comparing the rules, Indonesian regulation may be improved by
focusing on the disclosure requirements about the target company’s control
structure, which are found in Art. 10 of the EU Takeover Directive, but have
not been incorporated into Indonesian law. The control structure of the target
company, such as any deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule or the rule
concerning shareholding structure, is not fully addressed in the Indonesian
takeover regulations. Bapepam-LK has issued regulations concerning conflict
of interest transactions,234 which apply if the parties to a takeover potentially
have conflicting economic interests. Recent amendments to Bapepam Rules on
the annual reports of Indonesian publicly listed companies also address
beneficial ownership disclosures. 235 However, complex control structures
deserve more attention because they provide public shareholders with a more
complete understanding that may influence their decision-making.
Stakeholder (i.e. Employee) Engagement
Regulations that address the role of employees in a takeover
transaction are aimed at protecting employees as an integral part of the target
company’s stakeholders. Employee protection is incorporated into the EU
Takeover Directive, as indicated by the right to be properly informed, or
information rights, 236 and consultation rights in accordance with national
law. 237 Application of these rights is governed under bid requirements, 238
disclosure obligations,239 and information for and consultation of employee
representatives.240
Under the national law of the Netherlands, the Social Economic
Council of the Netherlands’s (Sociaal-Economische Raad or “SER”) Merger
Code applies to the process of acquisition and/or takeover. 241 The SER Merger
Code is applicable to takeovers that occur via a public bid.242 Before a public
announcement regarding a takeover is made, the employee association must be
informed about the content of such a takeover announcement and, if the prior
announcement conflicts with securities regulations, the notification must be
made at the time of the public announcement.243 In practice, after the initial
announcement is made, the offeror and the target company must notify the
employee association and provide them with a statement concerning the
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background for and the consequences of the transaction.244 In addition, such
notification must be sent to the Secretariat of the SER. 245 As part of the
employees’ engagement, the employees’ associations are entitled to be part of
the consultations about the deal, 246 and are entitled to express the employees’
opinions.247 Finally, the SER establishes an Adjudication Committee in the
event of any employment dispute resulting from a merger or takeover plan.248
The level of engagement of employees reveals a distinction between
Indonesian and Dutch law in takeover-transactions: Indonesian law does not
have any requirement to consult the employees during a takeover. Indonesian
general corporate law only provides that a takeover must consider the
employees’ interests, but do not provide detailed rules regarding this principle.
249
Meanwhile, Indonesian labor laws only deal with the employees’ rights to
receive compensation for employment termination.250 There is no forum for
employees to express their opinions regarding the deal itself. This lack of
employee involvement shows that Indonesian company law is less
stakeholder-oriented, compared with the Netherlands.
The Role of the Supervisory Authority and the Judiciary
There are two institutions in the Netherlands that are influential in
ensuring the integrity of takeover: the supervisory body and the judiciary. The
AFM is the supervisory body for public offers of securities. The AFM
regulates and supervises compliance with the takeover rules, and has authority
to oversee public offerings when the Dutch takeover code is applicable. All
takeovers require AFS approval, which means that the offeror is only allowed
to make a public offer if the AFM has approved the offering document.251 This
provision gives the AFM the power to suspend a public offer until it is sure
that all requirements have been met, especially the payment terms.252 The
AFM is different from most other European authorities because it is not
empowered to approve or disapprove all disclosures during the takeover
process.253 As a result, takeover rumors might be leaked to the market without
an official announcement that such transaction been approved by the AFM.254
Although the AFM does not have this power, it can still use its general powers
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as provided in Article 5:61 of the AFS.255 Furthermore, the AFM has authority
to relieve an offeror of some of its obligations.256
Aside from the AFM, the Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court
of Appeals, or the “Ondernemingskamer,” is part of the judiciary. The
Enterprise Division settles disputes regarding the requirement to carry out
mandatory offers, such as whether such an obligation exists after an
acquisition,257 the mandatory bid period,258 or determination of a “fair price” in
a mandatory offer.259 An order from the Court can lead to heavy intervention
in the governance of company, such as suspending the voting rights of the
party with predominant control, prohibiting the new controller from attending
a general meeting of the shareholders, nullifying a decision made at the
general meeting of shareholders, 260 or ordering the controlling shareholder to
reduce its percentage of stock. 261 There have been cases in which the
Enterprise Division heard disputes about the legality of anti-takeover
defenses.262 In short, the Dutch court specializing in commercial matters has
extensive authority to settle disputes related to takeovers and public bids in
order to safeguard the market.
It is important to compare the role of the supervisory authority and the
judiciary between the two countries. On one hand, the role of the judiciary in
safeguarding the capital market in Indonesia has been limited, and there have
been no adjudicated cases about takeover or public bid disputes. Therefore,
case law concerning this field does not exist in Indonesia. On the other hand,
Bapepam’s role as the regulator of the capital market has increased throughout
the years. Bapepam has discretion to carry out actions, such as extending the
period for a mandatory bid, 263 and nullifying a general meeting of
shareholders. 264 This discretion may become problematic because some
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Id. at 200; see also AFS s. 5:61 (allowing the AFM to force a company to correct a
notification if the company was initial incorrect).
256
Raaijmakers & van der Schee, supra note 175, at 200; see also AFS s. 5:81 art. 3
(“On application, the Authority for the Financial Markets may grant a full or partial
dispensation from the provisions laid down by or pursuant to Sections 5:74(1), 5:76(1)
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with those provisions and that the objectives which these sections seek to achieve are
achieved in other ways.”).
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See Note, Danielle Quinn, Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway
Towards Adopting Delaware Trilogy in Takeover Context, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1211 (2008) (detailing the merger of ABN AMRO and the Royal Bank of Scotland
in which the Enterprise Division played a crucial role).
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EDGE (Dec. 4, 2010, 6:04 PM), http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/businessnews/178082-maybank-gets-extension-until-june-2011-to-sell-down-bii-stake.html.
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See, e.g., Arinto Tri Wibowo, Saham Rights Issue CPRO Belum Tercatat Di BEI,
VIVA NEWS (Mar. 16, 2009, 7:49 PM),
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actions, such as nullifying a general meeting of shareholders, arguably should
be subjected to the judicial authority rather than the regulator, because a
general meeting of shareholders itself is an act of corporate governance, not an
administrative or licensing requirement.265 Indonesia can learn from Dutch law
and engage a special tribunal or chamber to resolve capital market and other
disputes about the financial system. The existence of the Enterprise Division
demonstrates that the enforcement of securities regulations requires not only
administrative proceedings, but also judicial proceedings to ensure due process
and legal certainty.

V. FINAL REMARKS
This article has discussed the rules governing takeovers in Indonesia.
Indonesia has enacted rules that protect the public and minority shareholders,
such as instituting a mandatory bid if a company reaches a certain threshold
that indicates a change of control. Disclosure requirements have been the
backbone of the Indonesian securities regulations and have been supervised by
Bapepam-LK, which soon will transform into the independent FSA. In
addition, there exist country-specific characteristics, such as the relationship
between securities regulations and FDI requirements and the sell-down rule
that preserves market liquidity.
Mandatory bids in Indonesia have been increasing to a higher threshold
in order to facilitate a more active takeover market. The share percentage
threshold above which a mandatory offer is triggered is lower in Indonesia
than in the Netherlands. However, in Indonesia control can be assessed by the
degree of one’s influence within the company’s governance as well as by share
percentages. In pricing a mandatory bid, each country adopts its own
approach, although the Netherlands adopts a more case-specific approach due
to its judiciary’s involvement. The Dutch disclosure rules are more advanced
because they are aimed at capturing indirect structures, such as a pyramid
structure or cross ownership. Indonesia can learn from the Netherlands
counterpart about how to increase employee involvement during a takeover
deal. Although in the Netherlands, as in Indonesia, the employees do not have
authority to approve or disapprove a takeover, they are empowered by the right
to receive information, the consultation right, and a dispute settlement forum
specifically for labor matters in the event of a change of corporate control.
Indonesian law, on the other hand, prescribes that a takeover must consider the
employees’ interests without setting out further detailed rules. Finally, the role
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Lapindo to Freehold, Tempo Interactive (Nov. 11, 2006, 4:36 PM),
http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/ekbis/2006/11/22/brk,20061122-88206,uk.html.
265
Pursuant to the Indonesian company law, and company law in general, a general
meeting of shareholders is a governance body within a corporation in which
shareholders can exercise their voting rights. It is not a regulatory or licensing
requirement, which needs regulatory approval. Therefore, one may question the
legality of annulment of such action by the regulator.
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of the judiciary in Indonesia must be improved in order to provide a fair,
orderly, and efficient capital market.
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